Part 1 established the theoretical framework for undertaking a top-down/bottom-up mash-up between the Axiomatic Design/Complexity Theory (AD/CT) and the Design Patterns (ÐP) framework. It synthesized an integrated N-model from the topdown V-Model and its antipodal/bottom-up Λ-model. Part 2 illustrates the approach in the domain of Cybersecurity. Recent trends in Cybersecurity indicates that our modern socio-technical systems are increasingly vulnerable to both external as well as internal threats. As the cost of defending our cyberstructures as well as the payoffs from successful attacks keeps rising, the cost of launching an attack simultaneously keeps decreasing. Cyber warfare is fundamentally asymmetric. Designing and managing modern socio-technical systems will demand greater appreciation for the language of threat-patterns and its defence. This paper applies the N-model to arrive at a generic pattern-language compositional technique using the Axiomatic Design Matrix. It then shows how one may splice the FR↔DP mappings with the FR↔ÐP mappings. Transcending the technical and into the socio, it is increasingly clear that wars of the future will be fought in the crucible of each individual human mind. Cognitive Biases are the patterns of weaknesses in this domain. The paper illustrates that patterns of cognitive biases can lead to patterns of cyber insecurity.
Introduction
rd Leg of /\/: Bottom-Up integrations, including those at the sub-system/system levels. Cross-Domain Integrations: This is where the AD/CT-ÐP mash-up may show unexpected positive results. Part 2 illustrates the approach using Cybersecurity Patterns. Section §2 reviews some of the recent high profile cyberattacks. Sections §3 to §6 cover the above N model. Section §4 puts forth a generic pattern-language compositional technique using the Axiomatic Design Matrix. Section §7 transcends the technical and into the social to make the case that cyber security patterns of attack ultimately originate in the realm of patterns of cognitive biases. And as information agents, we leave cybertraces of these patterns to our detriment. Boyd's OODA framework [15] provides a way to overcome these failures both at the individual as well as at the state level.
High-Profile Cyberattacks
Recent high-profile cyberattacks on public and private institutions have highlighted the growing vulnerabilities of our socio-technical systems. These include the attack on the U. [2] Consider the OPM case; here the attackers gained access to the 127-pages long SF-86 disclosure form detailing highly sensitive security clearance data that an applicant submits. This attack remained undetected for a whole year, spanning July-2014-June 2015. Commenting on the breach, FBI Director James Comey said [5] :
If While the cost of defending our cyberstructures as well as the payoffs from successful attacks keeps rising, the cost of launching an attack simultaneously keeps decreasing [7] . Also these are mass-customizable security breaches that have the potential to combine social-media, data-mining and precision targeting. A Reuters report summarizes the OPM incident as follows [6] Bunke et al. in [8] account for 415 security patterns (1997-2012) through digital-search and other means. And after culling for duplicates, 364 were deemed unique. Even so, duplicates may have been retained. In contrast, Hafiz et al. in [2] account for a limited set of 96 security patterns (1997-2012) put together using meticulous semantic mappings. Furthermore, this set is organized around a purpose-based, FR-centric framework, namely defending against the STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege) threat-model. In contrast, Bunke et al. [8] use a DP-centric application-domain approach (example: network, embedded systems, distributed systems etc.) for classifying the various ÐPs. Following Louis Sullivan's dictum "Form Follows Function" which is part and parcel of the AD/CT framework, it is logical to attempt the AD: ÐP mash-up using the work by Hafiz et al. [2] .
System Security issues may be broken into Core, Periphery and External Zones. Core-Security deals with securing the inner sanctum sanctorum of the system which includes data, processes, and the internal hardware. As an example, it includes securing against DoS (Denial-Of-Service: wherein the limited internal resources get swarmed) attack by continuous monitoring and parsimonious resource utilization. Perimeter Security deals with the "Quo Vadis?" aspect of the system that checks and enforces the authentication and authorization of anything that crosses the system boundary. External Security deals with securing system assets that are currently in transit outside the system boundary. The above triple-zone demarcation may sound obsolete in the current context of the immense commons that is opening up (such as Cloud Computing, BYOD, IoT etc.) and threatening to erode the very concept of a system identity and boundary. It is true that boundaries may shift, ownership may entail joint-ownership, and the "system" may consist of myriad agents working in temporary concert that shifts with time; but at any given point in time, the "system" is expected to exhibit a bounded nature along the lines shown above. Also given the relative size of the External zone, it is expected to dominate as is already evident in the number of ÐPs dedicated to this zone. And as the larger ecosystem evolves, so likewise should the threat model, which in AD-language means studying the evolving FR-realm. Fig. 1 lists the 96 ÐPs and their inferred FRs (as they are not explicated in [2] ). The cells are color coded based on STRIDE as well as Core, Periphery & External. Note that the Design Pattern (ÐP) is different from a Design Parameter (DP) in the sense that the former provides a recurring solution template to a recurring problem context; it is assembled bottom-up by studying an ensemble of paradigm cases prevalent in the industry. In contrast, the Design Parameters (DPs) are defined in a top-down sense, are specific to the problem at hand, and are not driven by exiting industry-wide norms. So how should a bottom-up, FR↔ÐP approach dove-tail with a top-down FR↔DP approach? We take this up next in the context of a Pattern Language. Chris Alexander (founder of the Design Patterns approach) was cognizant of the conflict between "design as selection" vs. "design as invention" when he asserted that [9] : "Those problems of creating form that are traditionally called "design problems" all demand invention."
But Chris was also aware of the human difficulties in scaling the combinatorial complexities inherent in the traditional approach [9] : "It is.
.
not possible to replace the actions of a trained designer by mechanically computed decisions. Yet at the same time the individual designer's inventive capacity is too limited for him to solve design problems successfully entirely by himself."
This is the Lickliderian Human-Machine symbiosis problem discussed in Part 1. To solve this logjam, Chris initially proposed a set-theoretic pattern-language that is mathematical enough to engage the machine, while human enough to break out of the patterns when needed [9] :
Caught in a net of language of our own invention, we overestimate the language's impartiality. Each concept, at the time of its invention no more than a concise way of grasping many issues, quickly becomes a precept. We take the step from description to criterion too easily, so that what is at first a useful tool becomes a bigoted preoccupation.
This framework has significant resemblance to the Axiomatic Design framework. Chris terms the hierarchical FRset as the set of misfits (M) and the linkages between the elements in M as the linkage set (L) which is akin to the Design Matrix (DM) in AD. These two sets together constitute a linear graph G(M,L). He then posits that this graph can be transformed into the design form by creating what he calls the "Constructive Diagram" (CD) which is indeed a holistic visualization of the Design Matrix (DM) at various levels [9] :
"We shall call a diagram constructive if and only if it is both at once -if and only if it is a requirement diagram and a form diagram at the same time."
Chris provides ample illustration of the Construction Diagram approach in [9] . And once the top down misfits & linkages graph G(M,L) as well as the Constructive Diagram (CD) is assembled, the designer may then synthesize the realization set (i.e., the DPs) in a top-down fashion. Here there is a key differences between the G(M,L) approach and AD; the G(M,L) approach does not recognize the zigzag mapping that occurs between the FRs and DPs at every stage of the decomposition. Thus the FRs have to be decomposed (topdown) before the DPs may be assembled (bottom-up). This is of course unrealistic; one cannot decompose the FRs into the next level without first mapping it to the DPs at the same level. This is also the reason why the FR linkage set L is presumed to be known without considering the DPs. Chris did not develop the G(M,L) approach further; instead he moved on and proposed the Pattern Language (ÐP/PL) approach which defines relationships between the patterns in a ÐP Catalog [10] :
The elements of this language are entities called patterns. Each pattern describes a problem which occurs over and over again in our environment, and then describes the core of the solution to that problem, in such a way that you can use this solution a million times over, without ever doing it the same way twice.
Here the fundamental problem is in coming up with an appropriate language ÐP/PL that is sufficiently structured to aid in the bottom-up cataloging of the ÐPs, the iterative, zigzag, top-down/bottom-up composition & decomposition of the design. Also it has to be sufficiently flexible to help identify gaps and allow reaching beyond the current catalog of ÐPs where necessary. This is where integrating Chris's G(M,L) framework [9] , his later work on ÐP/PL [10] have used a bottom-up approach to meticulously put together a series of Construction Diagrams (CDs) that capture the relationships between the various CyberSecurity ÐPs. These are then composed to arrive at a holistic CD which serves as the master Pattern Language that finds an appropriate place for each of the 96 ÐPs and the hierarchical/transformational relations between them. This is indeed a Pattern "Language" as it affords the expression of intent and execution both at a high level of abstraction as well as its transformation down into the concretes. Fig. 1 along with the color-coding shown therein. The DM is sparse with very few off-diagonal terms. Those on the diagonal that tend to be batched together have been demarcated with a bold red boundary. The design naturally evolves from a high-level grey (top-left) to external-in-green, the periphery-in-blue and the core-in-red tones (bottom-right). The few cells above the diagonal may be easily transformed to render the DM in a lower-triangular form to explicitly satisfy the axioms. Cells in pink are replaceable alternatives (where the FR, ÐP and the corresponding DM rows could be exchanged). Cells in purple allow feedback from lower-level design artifacts to those at the higher level, which asymptotically should fade across time. The DM does indeed provide all the functionality as that of the CDs. Also it completes the "unfinished symphony" that Chris Alexander started-off with in the context of the G(M,L) framework by correcting the stand-alone decomposition/composition of the FRs and ÐPs, and instead using the iterative, zigzag mapping between FRs↔DPs. Also, since the DM matrix can easily be transformed into an incidence matrix for input into a network graphing package (such as Mathematica or Gephi [11] ), the various CDs in [2] (both holistic and partial) may be automatically graphed. Fig.2 shows an example of the partial graphing of the first 16 FRs. Also, when viewed as a dynamic network, one may study how the Pattern Language is evolving across time. The DM is the ideal instrument to bring about the proper Lickliderian Human-Machine symbiosis in the context of design towards scale, which indeed has relevance for Agile.
The actual act of design in the context of a ÐP inspired PL involves a top-down traversal from the abstract to the concrete. If all of design were to be articulated via the PL, then there would be mostly "selection" and very little of "invention". It is therefore to be expected that any new FRs (especially at the higher levels) would necessitate splicing in novel, problemspecific FR↔DP mappings into the existing FR↔ÐP mappings. And as these newly created inventions make its way in the collection of similar designs, it may transition into a ÐP.
/ /\/: System Integration (3 rd -Leg)
Once the PL has been assembled, it is important to use it as an aid and not as a crutch. Otherwise, as Chris indicated, the "useful tool becomes a bigoted preoccupation".
As mentioned earlier, unlike DP, the ÐP is not specific to a given problem. That being the case, how could one ensure that in the case of a specific design problem, the ÐPs being used in the decompositional/compositional phases do provide adequate coverage? How will the ÐP/PL approach assure top-down coverage and bottom-up compatibility? As Chris recognized in [9] , the act of design is not merely in finding suitable sub-parts from a patterns cook-book. It instead is in grasping the whole, using composition of cook-book patterns where available, but filling the gaps with new and original one-of-a-kinds that may very well become patterns at a later date. Without such a holistic approach, the design would have holes and lack integrity. This is especially critical in the context of CyberSecurity as the adversary is constantly probing for security holes. Note that in Fig. 2 (color legend) , many of the cells are marked "NK"-meaning "not known". These are potential security holes that have not even been formulated. Used in this sense, the PL may be of value in identifying regions of lacunae in the ÐP catalog. Note that these are bottom-up approaches for the system integration of the ÐP-system itself.
Feedback and System Integration also occurs in the actual FR↔DP design. Thus, as noted before, DM cells in purple allow feedback from lower-level design artifacts to those at the higher level, which asymptotically should fade across time. And even though the hierarchical design tree is top-down acyclic, nothing stops us from traversing it in the opposite direction to test and prove that the lower nodes indeed does comply with the design intent set at the higher nodes. These are the many ways in which one may attain System Integration.
Cross-Domain Integrations
There is a key assertion made by Hafiz et al. regarding the lack of genericity in the PL [2] : "There is a pattern language for object-oriented design, and a pattern language for security, and another pattern language for performance."
It is true that when the PL is materialized as a set of CDs, it is indeed difficult to find commonalities. However, if the PL is captured as the DM and materialized as an incidence matrix of a network graph, the above ideal of PL genericity ought to be achievable. And as mentioned, this is where the AD/CT-ÐP mash-up may show unexpected positive results both at the tooling level as well as in seeding cross-domain integrations.
For example, the immune system ÐPs that nature has selected across billions of years of evolution of life may have direct relevance for modern Cyber Systems. So likewise when considering ÐPs in the context of 3D-printing and nanotechnology. As indicated in Part 1, Prof. Suh et al. adopted the V-Model to reverse-engineer the FR↔DP mappings of biological systems in a bottom-up/top-down sense [12] . When assembled across myriad such ensembles of related natural artifacts, these mappings then become FR↔ÐP mappings that have generic appeal. Nature after all preserves and reuses winning designs in the form of conserved genes that encode successful ÐPs.
Cognitive-Biases, OODA, Cyber-Warfare & CASoS
Having made the case for the use of ÐP/PL, consider now the dangers inherent in becoming too wedded to Design Patterns, especially in the context of Cyber-Security. While the scale and scope of the attacks discussed in §2 places it in the realm of Big Data, the defensive measures in terms of detection and year-long response-times have the cadence of wars fought in pre-historic times. This may be related to the fact that the theoretical foundations of cyberwar are not well founded. As Michael Hayden (former Director/CIA) has asserted [14] : "Rarely has something been so important and so talked about with less and less clarity and less apparent understanding."
Colonel John Boyd who wrote insightfully about asymmetric warfare does provide the appropriate framework for grasping the problem of CyberSecurity [15] Figs. 3a & 3b) . The OODA-loop is initiated with the observational phase, or problem perception. This involves sensing signals (both internal and external) from the micro, meso and macro levels (see Part 1). Next is the orientation phase where the problem is abstracted to the right level in the knowledge hierarchy. This is followed by the decision or the design phase. As shown in Fig. 3a , the "what" and the "how" from AD/CT map well with Boyd's OODA framework. Note however that AD/CT provides greater clarity by disambiguating the design process across the appropriate realms such as FRs, DPs, PVs, etc. The action phase of the OODA loop devolves into myriad leaf-level nodes, including the final PV's, the system integration, the testing, the training, etc. Each OODA cycle (both in whole and in parts) feeds the next cycle with the sole purpose of tightening the cognitive decision loop into "fast-transients". The fundamental insight that Boyd put forth was in grasping the role of conflict inherent in nature, how it manifests in human knowledge, and how it shapes our conceptual, hierarchical and fractal decision making processes. Fig. 3c shows some of the patterns of conflict that result when two or more adversaries engage. The green-arcs represent friendly OODA-loops; the red-arcs represent enemy actions. The various CyberSecurity breaches listed in §2 above fall into the pattern shown in Fig. 3c(i) . Here the adversary is intimately knowledgeable about the green-teams OODA loop and is synchronized to execute within it, but at a faster cadence. Thus commenting on the OPM breach, S. Gallagher (IT editor at ArsTechnica) noted that [16] Fig. 3c (ii) is the case of conceptual friendly-fire where the concrete-level decision-making is happening at a slower rate than the more abstract-layers; this is most likely on account of inadequate levels of automation at the lower levels. The converse of this pattern would be when the abstract layers are executing at too slow a rate to match the rapidly-evolving basal layers; this pattern was considered in Part 1. Fig. 3c(iii) is an extreme case of friendly-fire where the organization is dysfunctional enough to host two antagonistic cultures that are at cross-purposes with each other. Fig. 3c(iv) is the case of the swarm-attack (e.g., DoS), where multiple enemy agents are loosely coordinating scant resources to engage a slower moving target across the overall attack surface. Thus commenting on the origins of the OPM breach, R. Barger, cofounder of ThreatConnect stated that [6] : "We think it's likely a cohort of Chinese actors, a bunch of mini-groups that are handled by one main benefactor… [and] the group could get software tools and other resources from a common supplier."
While patterns in Figs. 3c(i) & 3c(iv) are compelling in capturing the conflicts between nation-states, the friendly-fire patterns in Figs. 3c (ii) & 3c(iii) are equally noteworthy. This is because as a system scales, it is these two seminal patterns inherent in a poorly conceived system that fundamentally compromise the integrity of a system, resulting in an inviting attack-surface for adversaries. Note that these friendly-fire OODA-loops may exist within a given individual or institution. Thus habits of thought and action that form within an individual or an institution can calcify and thwart breaking out of an outdated decision-cycle loop that is dominant. Humans are creatures of habit; and the tools we use (both individually as well as collectively), including tools such as ÐPs can trap us in.
Also, as Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman has shown [17] , we are encumbered with cognitive biases that form patterns of faulty decision-making styles. Our evolutionary bias is towards fast-paced, low-stratum, routine thinking (System 1), while high-stratum, out-of-the-box, complex thinking (System 2) requires intense focus and effort, and is therefore slow. Framing System 1 & 2 within the context of the knowledge-hierarchy dynamics and the proper symbiotic relationship between the human and the machine (as discussed in Part 1), it becomes increasingly clear that System-1 type thinking needs to be relegated more and more to the machine while humans move up the chain towards high-stratum, System-2 thinking. Mental confusion and paralysis of thought happens when Systems-1 and 2 are conflicted, as in Fig. 3c(iii) .
From the perspective of CyberSecurity, these inherent biases can be tracked and exploited by adversaries both within and without. For example, phishing-attacks take advantage of our cognitive-biases such as Priming and Confirmation-Bias. Priming sets up conscious and sub-conscious trust-associations (such as the look and feel of a bank web-site) that may be exploited. This may be thwarted by presenting the general website with a custom icon that is individual and personal to the user during the course of a multi-factor authentication. The underlying principle here is that it is not just the user who needs to authenticate; the website also needs to repeatedly establish that it is authentic. Confirmation-Bias is more abstract and internal and alludes to the notion that "if all you have is a hammer, then everything looks like a nail"; for example, in CyberSecurity, it could be a socially engineered Trojan sent from a compromised but trusted friend. Patterns of security or the lack of it is thus ultimately a state of the mind; to address it in a fundamental sense requires it to be reduced to patterns discernable in human cognitive biases as shown in [17] .
Wars of the future will be fought in the crucible of the individual human mind, but targeted at the mass populationlevel. Consider the expert assessment of the OPM breach [18] :
The The following quote from RUSI makes the stakes abundantly clear [19] : "The front line exists in the mind of each individual citizen." As modern life becomes more and more dependent on such massively complex socio-technical systems, it is imperative that we bring order to the looming chaos. Finally in section in §7, the case was made that Cyberwar is being waged at the fine-grain of the individual human mind as the war-front; that cognitive biases are fatal; that Boyd's theory of OODA-loops and fast-transients integrates well with the earlier framework of knowledge-dynamics to help understand why it is important to make and deliberately go about probing and breaking prevalent ÐPs. Also, when placed in the CASoS framework, the case was made that cross-system interfaces are choice spots for probing such weaknesses.
Conclusion

